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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to examine (1) individual differences in, and (2)
temporal precedence among, motive-goal congruence, imagination, and wellbeing. I hypothesized that the key variables are correlated; participants high in
congruence will be high in spontaneous imagination and well-being, and
imaginative individuals will be high in well-being. Regarding temporal
precedence, I hypothesized that motive-goal congruence precedes
spontaneous imagination and that spontaneous imagination precedes wellbeing. I employed the random intercepts cross-lagged panel model (RICLPM), a statistical model that fully separates the within-person level from the
between-person level. Results partially supported the hypotheses. The
hypothesized effects were documented at the level of individual differences.
However, analyses of temporal precedence did not yield significant lagged
effects. Some possible reasons for the lack of support for the hypothesized
lagged effects are discussed.
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Motive-Goal Congruence, Imagination, and Well-being: A longitudinal
analysis with a structural equation model
A hundred years ago, Sigmund Freud came to an insight that has
deeply influenced our culture and the way we see ourselves: the idea that our
behaviors are partly influenced by the unique interaction of conflicting
psychological forces (Freud & Crick, 1999). He demonstrated these forces
with the structural model of the mind, which described the mind’s structure
and function. Since Freud’s time, an interest in studying similar issues using
rigorous scientific methods has arisen. The purpose of this study is to test
whether and how congruence between two potentially conflicting motivations,
unconscious motives and conscious goals, is related to imaginativeness and
well-being.
Implicit Motives, Explicit Motives, and Explicit Goals
Henry Murray (1938) came up with a sophisticated, multimethod
approach to the assessment of human motives. A motive refers to an
inclination to seek out a certain class of incentives (e.g., achievement)
(McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; Murray, 1938). Motives can
have diverse effects, from the biology of the brain and body to societal,
historic, and economic phenomena (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010). Murray’s
methods laid the foundation for the discovery of two types of motives: implicit
and explicit (McClelland, Koestner, &Weinberger, 1989; Spangler, 1992).
Implicit motives refer to unconscious needs. Because implicit motives are old
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both phylogenetically and developmentally, they operate largely outside of the
individual’s awareness. Accordingly, individuals are unable to self-report their
own implicit motives when explicitly asked to do so. Hence, motive
researchers use indirect methods, primarily the thematic analysis of fantasy
stories (e.g., Thematic Apperception Test [TAT] or the Picture Story Test
[PSE]) or questionnaires about picture stimuli (e.g., Multi-Motive Grid [MMG]),
to assess the strength of a motive.
Most researchers identify three primary implicit motives: achievement,
power, and affiliation. Individuals high in the implicit need for achievement
(nAch) have non-conscious and recurrent preferences for affectively
rewarding experiences related to doing well in competition with a standard of
excellence. Therefore, within their chosen line of work, those high in implicit
nAch are likely to generate exceptional performances and outstanding quality
of outputs (Pang, 2010). Individuals high in implicit need for power (nPow)
strive to influence, control, and impress others. They enjoy receiving acclaim
and recognition; therefore, they seek positions in which they can exert
influence on the greatest number of people. In contrast, they avoid being
subject to the influence of others (Fodor, 2010; Winter, 1973). Individuals high
in implicit need for affiliation (nAff) strive to create, maintain, and restore a
positive emotional relationship with others. They fear the dissolution of these
relationships and therefore are sensitive and reactive to social cues, such as
human faces (Heyns, Veroff, & Atkinson, 1958; Weinberger, Cotler, &

4

Fishman, 2010).
Although implicit motives can temporarily fluctuate, some people are
generally more sensitive than others to a given class of incentives. Implicit
motives are known to influence spontaneous behavioral tendencies. For
example, implicit motives predict major trends in one’s life trajectory, such as
choice of career (Fodor, 2010; McClelland et al., 1989, Smith, 1992; Winter,
1973; Winter 2010). Individuals high in implicit nAff have been shown to
choose careers that are people-oriented (e.g. nursing, social work) and avoid
solo careers, whereas those high in implicit nPow have been shown to
choose careers in which they can influence others (e.g. business executive,
judge) (Reeve, 2015; Sid & Lindgren, 1981; Weinberger et al., 2010).
In contrast to implicit motives, explicit motives guide people’s
conscious goal setting and decision making (McClelland, 1980; McClelland et
al., 1989). They do not predict major life choices (e.g. choice of career), but
predict controlled and verbally framed types of behavior, such as one’s
responses to specific social norms or tangible rewards (McClelland, 1985;
McClelland et al., 1989). Unlike implicit motives, explicit motives may be
assessed with self-report methods (e.g., Personality Research Form [PRF];
Motive Enactment Test [MET]; and Goal questionnaire), because individuals
are aware of the things that they strive for.
Explicit motives are influential in one’s development of explicit goals
(Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grässman, 1998; McClelland, 1985). Explicit goals
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are similar to explicit motives, but are focused on more specific and
contextualized aims. Therefore, explicit goals differ from implicit motives in
some important respects. First, implicit motives involve enduring preferences
on a broader scale. It is easy to find a certain type of implicit incentive that
can satisfy an implicit motive because the incentives are more available in a
wide array of situations. In contrast, explicit goals are more narrowly defined
aims that are specific in delineating what a person consciously strives to do
within a specific domain. Therefore, a person may have difficulty finding
incentives that can satisfy one’s goals. Second, the two are based on
contrasting thought processes. The accomplishment of goals often requires
considerable effort and control, which is a feature of a “system 2” process —
a controlled type of thinking involved in focus, deliberation, reasoning or
analysis. In contrast, implicit motives and behavioral trends are likely to
represent “system 1” process — the spontaneous type of thinking involved in
fast, intuitive reactions and instantaneous decisions (Stanovich & West,
2002).
Motive-Goal Congruence
Because implicit motives and explicit goal setting are adaptive in
different circumstances, the two are not necessarily aligned with one another.
Individuals’ explicit goals are consciously embraced and tend to be selected
based on explicit motives that are influenced by external environmental
situations and social expectations. The two types of motivation are known to
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be weakly correlated in a given domain (Thrash, Elliot, & Schultheiss, 2007).
It follows that people sometimes pursue goals that are congruent with their
implicit motive disposition, whereas sometimes they strive for ill-fitting goals
that are not matched to their implicit motives. Moreover, there are
considerable individual differences in the extent to which an individual’s levels
of implicit motives and explicit goals are aligned. Researchers use the term
motive-goal congruence to refer to the alignment between systems and
consider this to be one of the important topics in personality psychology. As
traditionally defined, similar level of implicit motives and explicit goals within a
given domain indicate that an individual is motivationally congruent, whereas
dissimilar levels indicate that the individual is incongruent.
Examples are easily found in organizational contexts. Brandstätter,
Job, and Schulze (2016) gave examples of two employees who are
experiencing misfit between implicit motives and explicit career goals. The
first case is an accountant who is an outgoing person, enjoys being in
company and seeks closeness in her social relationships. However, her
working environment provides her hardly any contact with colleagues or
clients. Thus, her job does not offer many opportunities to socialize and to be
in a trusting mutual exchange with other people. Another employer is a midlevel manager, who is expected to take on responsibility for his team, and
motivate and supervise his staff members—in short, to influence other
people. However, he does not like to take center stage and feels awkward in
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his role as a leader. Brandstätter et al. (2016) noted that these seem to be
different situations at the first sight; however, a similar predicament is present
in the two cases. The two employees’ motives are not well-matched to the
demands and opportunities their jobs offer them; thus these individuals
illustrate the problem of motive-goal incongruence.
Motive-Goal Congruence and Well-being
The underlying assumption of many well-being researchers is that a
sense of happiness and satisfaction can be achieved when people
successfully strive for desired end states (Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh, Lucas,
& Smith, 1999). However, reaching a desired end state does not always bring
happiness and satisfaction. Brunstein and colleagues (1998) posited that
motive-goal incongruence has implications for the well-being benefits of
successful goal pursuit. Progress toward goals that are not congruent with
one’s implicit motives may result in lower positive affect compared to progress
toward goals that are congruent with one’s implicit motives. The perceived
happiness and satisfaction of an individual generally is contingent on what the
person is attempting to accomplish in one’s life and how successful the
progress is (Brickman & Coates, 1987; Cantor & Sanderson, 1999). Implicit
motives are general determinants of which activities are rewarding and
satisfying. Thus, the extent to which explicit goals are congruent with one’s
implicit motives will be an important indicator of well-being (Brunstein et al.,
1998). Individuals who select goals that are furnished with the incentives that
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satisfy their dominant implicit motives will easily attain motive satisfaction
while they strive for their desired states. They will ultimately experience
enhanced well-being when they achieve their goals. On the other hand,
people who strive for goals that do not align with implicit motives will not gain
feelings of reward or satisfaction (Sheldon & Elliot 1999; Sheldon & HouserMarko 2001).
There is some empirical support for an association between motivegoal congruence and various well-being constructs. Brunstein and colleagues
(1998) found that students who pursued motive-congruent goals experienced
enhanced emotional well-being upon goal attainment, whereas students with
goals that are incongruent with their implicit motives experienced a decline in
well-being. Kehr (2004) and Baumann et al. (2005) also found that motivegoal incongruence predicts lower levels of affective well-being. Some studies
examined whether the effect of motive-congruence on well-being is equal
across different cultural contexts. For example, Hofer, Chasiotis, and Campos
(2006) found that, across cultures, motive-goal incongruence predicts lower
life satisfaction. Job, Oertig, Brandstätter, and Allemand (2010) found that
motive-goal incongruence is related to higher levels of negative affect. In
studies of managers (Kazén & Kuhl, 2011) and teachers (Wagner, Baumann,
& Hank, 2016), well-being was found to be highest among those who are high
in motive-goal congruence and was shown to be the lowest among those who
are low in motive-goal congruence.
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However, there also are studies that have shown a weak or null
relationship between motive-goal congruence and well-being (e.g. McAuley,
Bond, & Ng, 2004). Hofer and Busch (2017) also explained that there has
been a lack of research showing that motive-goal congruence per se is
sufficient to produce positive effects on well-being. The precise mechanisms
that underpin the relationship between motive-goal congruence and
promotion of well-being have not been established definitively.
Imagination as a Mediator
My goal in this thesis is to examine whether imagination functions as a
mediator of the effect of motive-goal congruence on well-being. Imagination
has been chosen as a candidate mediator because congruence is expected
to facilitate productive imaginative activity regarding goals and strategies, and
such imaginative activity, in turn, is expected to facilitate positive outcomes,
including well-being.
Past conceptualizations of imagination have been diverse, spanning
defensive projection, apperception, mind-wandering, dreaming, fantasy,
hallucination, pretend play, transportation into narrative, counterfactuals,
simulation of futures, and creative thinking. A consensus about what exactly
imagination is and how it operates has been lacking (Dietrich, 2004). In the
current project, I focus on a spontaneous form of imagination, which focuses
on “system 1” constructs throughout ideation processes. In the book “Mimesis
as Make-Believe” (1939), Walton described the spontaneous imagination as
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having its own life. To some degree, the imaginer plays a role of “spectator”
(rather than perpetrator) who watches as the world of imagination unfolds.
The spontaneous imagination is explained as more vivid and realistic as well
as yielding more excitement to the imaginer. As I define it (narrowly) herein,
imagination involves a generative flow of imagery-rich ideation that may be
employed as one makes decisions about what goals to pursue or how to
pursue them. This goal- and strategy-oriented form of spontaneous
imagination must be distinguished from cases of mind-wandering and fantasy
that are often irrelevant to one’s strivings.
There is some preliminary evidence that spontaneous imagination
promotes well-being. Positive psychologists have proposed that selftranscendent emotions, such as elevation and awe, may promote well-being
or pleasure (Haidt & Keltner, 2004; Peterson & Seligman, 2004).
Spontaneous imagination shares some features with self-transcendent states,
such as passivity. For example, Desmond (2008) argues that imagination
produces spontaneous ecstasies that guide us both to intimate inwardness
and to possible otherness. Moreover, inspiration, a motivation guided by
imagery-rich ideation, has been found to have positive causal effects on
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being (Thrash, Elliot, Maruskin, & Cassidy,
2010). Unlike deliberative thought, spontaneous imagination provides a
natural bridge from initial ideation to fruition and ultimately induces human
thriving. Therefore, I propose that spontaneous imagination plays a central
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role in the promotion of human flourishing, because it provides the natural
incentive to aid individuals moving on to self-transcendent states.
The expectation that spontaneous imagination is a consequence of
motive-goal congruence is based on philosophical and psychological
literatures that conceptualize imagination as the conscious expression of
unconscious processes (e.g., Murray, 1938). To imagine, one’s
consciousness must be able to account for absent or non-existent contents
(Sartre, 1940). Therefore, I believe that variability in imaginativeness may be
due to congruence between implicit motive (unconscious) and explicit goal
(conscious). Lack of imaginativeness may be a symptom of failing to build a
bridge from one’s deep-seated implicit motive to conscious motivational
strivings. In addition, motive-goal incongruence is known to hinder selftranscendent states, which include flow and spontaneous imagination
(Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
Overview of Present Study
An 8 week, 3-wave longitudinal panel study was designed to assess
the three key variables (motive-goal congruence, spontaneous imagination,
and well-being) at each time point. The two primary goals of the current
research were to examine individual differences in, and the temporal
precedence among, the three variables. I hypothesized that participants high
in congruence will be high in spontaneous imagination and well-being and
that participants rich in imagination will score high in well-being. In addition, I
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hypothesized that motive-goal congruence precedes spontaneous
imagination and that spontaneous imagination precedes well-being.
This study employs a state-of-the-art statistical method—the random
intercepts cross-lagged panel model (RI-CLPM)—to test these hypotheses.
The traditional cross-lagged panel model (CLPM) has been widely used for
addressing the issue of temporal precedence (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken,
2003; Finkel, 1995; Menard, 2002). However, the underlying assumption of
the CLPM is that every participant varies over time around the same grand
mean. This assumption is not defensible. Therefore, the CLPM model is likely
to be misspecified in most applications, and therefore the technique is prone
to false claims of causality. Therefore, it is necessary for researchers to fully
separate the within-person level from the between-person level, and the RICLPM model accomplishes this.
Hamaker, Kuiper, and Grasman (2015) recently proposed the RICLPM as an alternative to CLPM. This approach builds upon the CLPM and
involves adding a random intercept for each construct in the model. In a
structural equation modeling framework, this random intercept may be
modeled as a stable latent variable on which all assessments of a given
variable load equally (i.e., all loadings are constrained to equal 1). With the
addition of random intercepts, researchers can fully partial out betweenperson variance in all constructs, thus removing bias from estimates of crosslagged effects. Moreover, the random intercepts are of interest in their own
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right, because they allow for tests of hypotheses at the level of individual
differences. Because the RI-CLPM allows for tests of both individual
differences and temporal precedence, it is ideally suited for testing the two
hypotheses of this investigation.
Another goal in the current paper is to model the complex motive-goal
congruence construct more efficiently than in past research. The traditional
method of computing motive-goal congruence scores is based on a normative
definition of congruence. One is congruent if one has similar z-scores (i.e.,
relative to others) on the motive and goal constructs.
Despite of the popularity of this approach, the normative approach to
congruence has several weaknesses. First, it is arbitrary in the way that it
treats sample distributions as universally valid reference points. Preferably,
researchers would consider applying unique reference points for separate
individuals because of the nature of individual differences. Second, the
normative approach does not take into consideration the individual’s unique
profiles of motive scores and goal scores across motive domains (i.e.,
achievement, affiliation, and power). Finally, the method requires either use of
difference scores, which are unreliable and involve loss of information, or use
of interactions, which are low in power and are cumbersome when examining
multiple motive domains. To overcome these problems, I examine configural
congruence (Thrash, Cassidy, Maruskin, & Elliot, 2010). Configural
congruence refers to the similarity of an individual’s motive and goal profiles
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across content domains.
Method
Participants
Participants were 584 undergraduate students (172 men, 412 women)
enrolled in introductory psychology courses. Participants received research
credit ranging from 0-2.5 hours depending how many waves of the study they
completed. The average age was 19.10. Ethnicity was distributed as follows:
African American, 7.5%; Asian, 14.4%; Caucasian, 68.5%; Hispanic, 5%;
Native American, .5%; Other, 4.1%.
Procedure
Participants were recruited through the SONA system. After providing
informed consent, participants completed a 15-minute trait questionnaire.
These data are not used in the present investigation and are not discussed
further. Then, participants were guided to the second part of the study, which
is longitudinal. It consisted of three online assessments with a span of four
weeks between consecutive assessments. These three assessments
involved completing the same questionnaire measures of key variables. On
the designated weeks, the link to the assessment was sent out via email on
the morning of the Wednesday and participants were asked to complete the
assessment on that day or as soon as possible thereafter. Each assessment
was designed to take approximately 45 minutes. Data were collected across
three semesters in order to attain an adequately large sample.
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Measures
Implicit motives. A short version of the Multi-Motive Grid (MMG-S;
Sokolowski, Schmalt, Langens, & Puca, 2000) was used to measure implicit
motives in the achievement, affiliation, and power domains (see Appendix A).
The MMG-S is a so-called “semi-projective” measure, derived from the
Picture Story Exercise (PSE; Koestner & McCllelland, 1935) and its
predecessor, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Morgan & Murray, 1935).
Like the PSE and TAT, the MMG-S provides a series of ambiguous pictorial
stimuli consisting of one or more people. However, in contrast to PSE and
TAT, participants do not engage in a story-writing task. Instead, participants
are asked to put themselves in the position of one of the pictured persons,
and then respond “yes” or “no” to a set of statements about how the person in
the picture may feel or think. Each statement is oriented toward a particular
motive domain. Examples of items are “Feeling good about meeting other
people” and “Feeling confident to succeed at this task”. The following
variables were assessed: hope for success (nAch), hope for power (nPow),
and hope for affiliation (nAff).
The short version of MMG (MMG-S) trimmed the total number of
statements from 72 to 49. It contains eleven pictures extracted from the
original version. The scores for individuals’ implicit motives are calculated by
adding up all the domain-relevant statements answered with a “yes” for all
pictures.
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Explicit goals. An explicit goal measure was designed specifically for
this study. Participants responded to a list of 12 goals on a 7-point-Likert
scale (1 = Have not been committed at all, 7 = Have been extremely
committed) (see Appendix B). The goal questionnaire contains four
achievement goals (e.g., ‘‘During the past month, I have aimed to succeed or
do well at the things I do’’), four affiliation goals (e.g., ‘‘During the past month,
I have aimed to spend lots of time with people I care about’’), and four power
goals (e.g., ‘‘I want to appear self-confident to the other students’’). To assess
the participants’ goal commitments at the present state of a particular wave, I
administered the goal measure twice at each wave, once regarding the past
month (“During the past month, I have aimed to…”) and again regarding the
next month (“During the next month, I aim to…”). Achievement, affiliation, and
power goal indexes were computed by averaging across the relevant set of 8
items (i.e., 4 past, 4 future).
Computation of motive-goal congruence. A correlation coefficient
may be used to quantify the similarity between motive and goal profiles
across the achievement, affiliation, and power domains. However, profile
correlations are affected arbitrarily by the direction in which a given variable in
the profile is scored (Tellegen, 1965). Cohen (1969)’s remediation for this
problem was to append a second set of profile scores to the first, with all
variables reflected in the appended profile, and then to compute the profile
correlation in the usual fashion.
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With Cohen’s (1969) remediation, the motive profile for a given
participant would now consist of six rather than three values: three for the
original motive domains (achievement, affiliation, power) and three for the
reflected motive scores. The goal profile likewise would consist of six rather
than three scores. Across the six cases, the motive-goal profile correlation
may be computed, and the resulting correlation is invariant to the original
direction of scoring. After computing a profile correlation for each participant, I
used Fisher’s r-to-z transformation to normalize the distribution. The resulting
z scores indicate the degree to which a person’s goals have the same
configuration as their motives.
Spontaneous imagination. The study used the recently developed
Imagination and Motivation Questionnaire (IMQ; see Appendix C), which
integrates the assessment of motivation and imagination. The questionnaire
identifies two distinct higher-order constructs, “system 1” and “system 2”,
which represent distinct types of creative cognition processes. Each higherorder construct encompasses 5 lower-order facets that concern system 1 or
system 2 variants of (a) pre-ideation motivation, (b) control of ideation, (c)
ideation modality, (d) appraisal process, and (e) post-ideation motivation. The
entire scale consists of 30-item, with 3 items per subscale. Participants
responded to each item using a 7-point-Likert scale.
The current study focuses on the system 1 subscales which concern
spontaneous processes: being inspired “by” (pre-ideation motivation),
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spontaneous ideation (control of ideation), non-verbal imagery (ideation
modality), illumination (appraisal process), and being inspired “to” (postideation motivation). Example items from these subscales are as follows: “My
ideas are impacted by the inspiring ideas, actions, or creations of others”
(being inspired “by”), “My ideas seem to take shape on their own”
(spontaneous ideation), “My ideas form clear pictures in my mind” (non-verbal
imagery), “I catch a glimpse of new or better possibilities” (illumination), “I feel
inspired to express or give life to my ideas” (being inspired “to”).
Well-being. The set of well-being measures included both eudaimonic
and hedonic well-being variables.
Positive and negative affect. Positive affect (PA) and negative affect
(NA) were assessed using the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix D), which consists
of 20 mood adjectives. Ten mood adjectives assess PA (e.g., “interested”)
and ten assess NA (e.g., “distressed”). Participants were asked to indicate to
what extent they have experienced the given feeling during the past month.
Items were rated with 5-point Likert scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 5 =
extremely).
Satisfaction with life. Participants completed three items from
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985; see Appendix E). I
excluded two of the original 5 items because the statements are inappropriate
for assessing life satisfaction as a state. Participants responded to the
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following statements: “In most ways, my life is close to ideal”, “The conditions
of my life are excellent” and “I am satisfied with my life” with a 7-point-Likert
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants’ responses
were averaged to compute their life satisfaction.
Meaning of Life. The 10-item Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ;
Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006; see Appendix F) was used to measure
meaning of life. The measure includes subscales for presence of meaning
and search for meaning. Only the presence subscale is used in this study.
Participants were asked to take a moment to think about what makes their life
feel important. Participants responded to each statement using a 7-pointLikert scale (1 = absolutely untrue, 7 = absolutely true). Example items are “I
Have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful” and “I have discovered
a satisfying life purpose.”
Spirituality. Spirituality was assessed using the 4-item Meaning
subscale of Pekala’s (1991) Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory
(see Appendix G). Items concern how often the participant had a spiritual or
transcendent experience during the past month. Participants responded using
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = rarely or never, 7 = very often). Example items are
“Existence became deeply sacred or meaningful” and “I had an experience of
awe and reverence toward the world.”
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Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables can be found in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The unstandardized path estimates, and two
standardized path estimates for the first and the second lags are reported in
Table 3 (unstandardized = B; standardized first lag = 𝛽12; standardized
second lag = 𝛽23).
RI-CLPM analyses were conducted using Mplus 7.4 (Muthén &
Muthén, 2012). Missing data were estimated using Mplus maximum likelihood
estimation procedures. I specified that all three variables (motive-goal
congruence, imagination, and well-being) at a given time point predict all
three variables at the next time point. For the sake of parsimony, I
constrained the structural paths of the first lag and second lag to be invariant.
This procedure yields a single overall unstandardized estimate for each
hypothesis and establishes stationarity. Variables assessed at the same time
point were allowed to correlate. I modeled three random intercepts that
correspond to the three constructs. All loadings on the intercepts were
constrained to 1. The three random intercepts were allowed to correlate.
Figure 1 illustrates the model used for the analysis.
Results showed that this model yielded good fit, 𝑥 2 = 39.80 (df = 15),
p < .001, RMSEA = .054 (90% CI = .034–.075), CFI = .989, TLI = .974. The
covariances among the three random intercepts were significant: motive-goal
congruence and imagination (cov = .089, r = .429), motive-goal congruence
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and well-being (cov = .085, r = .502), and imagination and well-being (cov =
.215, r = .495). Table 4 presents covariances and correlations for the matrix.
The results indicate that congruent individuals tend to be rich in spontaneous
imagination and high in well-being and that spontaneously imaginative
individuals tend to be high in well-being.
The auto-regressive effect was significant for motive-goal congruence
(B = .129, 𝛽12 = .125, 𝛽23 = .141, p < .05), imagination (B = .097, 𝛽12 = 095,
𝛽23 = .096, p < .05), and well-being (B = 086, 𝛽12 = .085, 𝛽23 = .083, p < .05).
However, none of the cross-lagged paths was statistically significant.
Therefore, this analysis failed to support the hypothesis that motive-goal
congruence precedes imagination and that imagination precedes well-being.
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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics.
M

SD

Cronbach’s α

2.03

.70

N/A

Imagination

.53
.40
.50
5.93
5.77
4.60
4.97

.18
.18
.19
.79
.98
1.32
.91

.614
.614
.582
.853
.897
.920
.905

Well-being

0

.68

.721

PA

3.58

.68

.874

NA

2.39

.84

.897

SWL

5.05

1.42

.879

ML

4.4

1.43

.901

Spirituality

3.47

1.5

.828

2.008

.73

N/A

Imagination

.54
.42
.54
5.81
5.60
4.54
4.87

.19
.18
.19
.83
.97
1.28
.92

.644
.608
.588
.874
.895
.923
.910

Well-being

0

.69

.738

PA

3.42

.72

.888

NA

2.44

.88

.909

SWL

4.90

1.47

.899

ML

4.40

1.41

.900

Spirituality

3.33

1.54

.858

2.01

.67

N/A

.55
.42

.21
.19

.694
.648

Variable
Wave 1
Motive-Goal
Congruence
Implicit motives

Explicit goals

nAch
nAff
nPow
nAch
nAff
nPow

Wave 2
Motive-Goal
Congruence
Implicit motives

Explicit goals

nAch
nAff
nPow
nAch
nAff
nPow

Wave 3
Motive-Goal
Congruence
Implicit motives

nAch
nAff
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nPow
nAch
nAff
nPow

Imagination

.56
5.70
5.57
4.48
4.79

.21
.91
.93
1.32
.98

.675
.882
.873
.932
.927

Well-being

3.66

.73

.759

PA

3.35

.74

.891

NA

2.37

.90

.915

SWL

4.97

1.48

.908

ML

4.41

1.50

.927

Spirituality

3.20

1.51

.862

Explicit goals

Notes. nAch = need of achievement. nAff = need of affiliation. nPow = need of power.
PA = positive affect. NA = negative affect. SWL = satisfaction with life. ML = meaning
of life.

Table 2.
Matrix of correlations
Wave 1
MGC
Wave
1

Wave
2

Wave
3

IMA

Wave 2
WB

MGC

IMA

Wave 3
WB

MGC

IMA

MGC

--

IMA

.16**

--

WB

.16**

.37**

--

MGC

.24**

.13**

.17**

--

IMA

.15**

.66**

.35**

.15**

--

WB

.13**

.30**

.81**

.17**

.39**

--

MGC

.20**

.14**

.15**

.34**

.17**

.16**

--

IMA

.13**

.67**

.35**

.17**

.76**

.47**

.20**

--

WB

.15**

.25**

.77**

.16**

.35**

.84**

.16**

.47**

Notes. MGC = Motive-Goal Congruence. IMA = Imagination. WB = Well-being.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

WB

--
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Figure1. Random intercept cross-lagged panel model of motive-goal congruence, imaginatnion, and well-being.

Notes. M-G congruence = motive-goal congruence. T = time. R = random intercept. e = error term. Random
intercept and error term for imagination contruct ommitted for visual clarity.
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Table 3.
Standardized and Unstandardized coefficients
unstandardized estimates

Standardized estimates

Path

B

𝜷𝟏𝟐

𝜷𝟐𝟑

MGC  MGC

.129 *

0.125*

0.141*

MGC  IMA

.015

.011

.012

MGC  WB

-.021

-.022

-.022

IMA MGC

.002

.002

.002

IMA  IMA

.097*

.095*

.096*

IMA  WB

-.027

-.037

-.037

WB  MGC

-.053

-.049

-.055

WB  IMA

.022

.016

.016

WB  WB

.086**

.085**

.083*

Notes. MGC = motive-goal congruence. IMA = imagination. WB = well-being. 𝛽12 = standardized
estimates for the first lag. 𝛽23 = standardized estimates for the second lag. *p < .05. **p < .01

Table 4.
Covariance and Correlations among Random Intercepts
cov

r

MGC↔IMA

.089**

.429**

MGC ↔ WB

.085**

.502**

IMA↔ WB

.215**

.495**

Notes. MGC = motive-goal congruence. IMA = imagination. WB = well-being. *p <
.05. **p < .01
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Discussion
Many studies have explored the effect of motive-goal congruence on
well-being. However, whether motive-goal congruence is the cause of wellbeing has not been examined thoroughly. In addition, it remains unclear what
mechanisms explain this relationship. I proposed that spontaneous
imagination functions as a mediator, collected a large sample, and designed a
longitudinal panel study to explore the temporal precedence among motivegoal congruence, spontaneous imagination and well-being. I also
implemented a sophisticated RI-CLPM to examine both individual differences
and within-person lagged effects. I hypothesized that motive-goal congruence
would have a positive cross-lagged impact on spontaneous imagination and
that spontaneous imagination would have a positive cross-lagged impact on
well-being.
I was able to detect the between-person level differences as expected.
However, results indicated that I failed to find support for the temporal
precedence and within-person causal effects. Only the auto-regressive effects
were significant in the cross-lagged portion of the model. Therefore, the
current research partially supported the hypotheses. In the following, I discuss
some possible reasons for the lack of support for the hypothesized lagged
effects.
First, I suggest such partial findings may result from the
implementation of the RI-CLPM. While the traditional CLPM itself is a rigorous
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model, the RI-CLPM is even more stringent. The RI-CLPM fully separates
individual differences from within-person change. Accordingly, researchers
will have less possibility to document expected results because the RI-CLPM
approach is not susceptible to false-positive effects to which the CLPM model
is susceptible. Given that this technique is so stringent, perhaps an even
larger sample is needed to detect cross-lagged effects.
Second, it is possible that a longer lag between assessments is
required. Due to the nature of the undergraduate research pool, the time span
of the current research could not stretch beyond an 8-week period. However,
it is possible that changes in the variables such as spontaneous imagination
or motive-goal congruence require study of trends across the life span or at
least with more than the span of four weeks between consecutive
assessments. The fact that hypotheses were supported at the level of
individual differences (random intercepts) raises the possibility of long-term
developmental causal effects.
Third, researchers should note that the measuring method for
spontaneous imagination in this study consists of 5 lower-order subscales:
inspired by, spontaneous ideation, non-verbal imagery, illumination, and
inspired to. It is possible that motive-goal congruence is more relevant to
some particular facets of spontaneous imagination than others. In addition,
some facets of the five subscales may be more relevant to well-being
constructs.
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Fourth, the measurement used to assess implicit motives, MMG, may
be not adequate for the study of motive-goal configural congruence. The two
implicit measures, PSE and MMG, have a commonality in that participants
are asked to evaluate other people’s feelings, behavior, and thoughts. While
the PSE is the oldest and most used approach to measure implicit motives, I
implemented the MMG given the method’s advantage of providing simple
computation. The MMG procedure asks participants to answer “yes” or “no” to
pre-formulated, domain-oriented statements. Therefore, the motive scores are
easily calculated by summing up corresponding items, whereas the PSE
requires that human coders analyze the text materials based on detailed
scoring rules. The present study would have required coding nearly 10,000
stories. However, researchers should note that PSE and MMG may differ in
the extent to which they stimulate participants’ identification processes of
implicit motives. Future research may benefit from considering multiple types
of congruence: (1) MMG implicit motives-explicit goals, (2) PSE implicit
motives-explicit goals, and (3) MMG implicit motives-PSE implicit motives.
Possibly these three forms of congruence function as indicators of an
underlying congruence latent variable.
Past research on motive-goal congruence has relied on the normative
measurement model. My effort to bring attention to configural congruence,
including positive findings at the level of individual differences, provides a
promising new direction for future research.
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Appendix A
A short version of the Multi-Motive Grid
(MMG-S; Sokolowski, Schmalt, Langens, & Puca, 2000)
Picture Imagination Task
On the following pages, you will see a set of pictures showing all kinds of everyday
situations. We did not choose clear and detailed pictures because we want you to
use your imagination in guessing what might be going on in these pictures. Please
try to put yourself in the position of one of the persons who are shown in these
pictures.
Below these pictures, you will also find a set of statements describing the way people
could think and feel in this situation. Please decide for each statement whether it
describes the situation that you imagine. If it does, choose YES, if it does not,
choose NO. Please do not think about a single statement too long and try to follow
your spontaneous impression.
Note: If you recognize any of the pictures, don't worry about how you responded
previously. Just focus on what you presently imagine.

Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
Hoping to get in touch with other people
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Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people
Being afraid of being overpowered by other people
Hoping to get in touch with other people

Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Being afraid of being boring to others
Feeling good about one’s ability
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Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Being afraid of being boring to others
Feeling good about one’s ability

Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people
Being afraid of being overpowered by other people
Hoping to get in touch with other people
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Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Being afraid of being rejected by others
Feeling good about one’s ability

Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Feeling good about one’s ability
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing (high status)
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Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people
Hoping to get in touch with other people
Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Feeling good about one’s ability
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing (high status)

Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Feeling good about one’s ability
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing (high status)
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Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people
Hoping to get in touch with other people
Thinking about lacking abilities at this task
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing (high status)

Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling confident to succeed at this task
Feeling good about one's ability
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing (high status)
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Imagine what might be happening in the picture. Then say whether each of the
following statements describes the situation you imagine.
No
Yes
Feeling good about meeting other people
Being afraid of being overpowered by other people
Hoping to get in touch with other people
Trying to influence other people
Hoping to acquire a good standing (high status)
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Appendix B
Measure of Explicit Goals
Note: Options below each item were presented on a 7-point numbered scale from 1
(Have not been committed at all) to 7 (Have been extremely committed).
Below is a list of goals that you may or may not be pursuing. First, we ask to what
extent have you been committed to pursuing each goal over the past month. Then,
below, we ask to what extent you are committed to pursuing each goal over the next
month. Please respond as accurately and realistically as you can.
During the past month, I have aimed...
1.
2.
3.
4.

...to succeed or do well at the things I do.
...to do a really good job on projects at school or work.
...to continuously improve at things and develop my skills.
...to do well at things compared to others.

5.
6.
7.
8.

...to get to know more people.
...to have close relationships or friendships.
...to have friendly or close relations with others.
...to spend lots of time with people I care about.

9. ...to be a respected and influential leader.
10. ...to be a leader of others.
11. ...to have impact on other peoples' lives.
12. ...to have influence over others.

During the next month, I aim...
1.
2.
3.
4.

...to succeed or do well at the things I do.
...to do a really good job on projects at school or work.
...to continuously improve at things and develop my skills.
...to do well at things compared to others.

5.
6.
7.
8.

...to get to know more people.
...to have close relationships or friendships.
...to have friendly or close relations with others.
...to spend lots of time with people I care about.

9. ...to be a respected and influential leader.
10. ...to be a leader of others.
11. ...to have impact on other peoples' lives.
12. ...to have influence over others.
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Appendix C
Imagination and Motivation Questionnaire (IMQ)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a 7-point numbered scale from 1
(Never) to 7 (Very often).
Getting good ideas is important in all areas of life. For example, people need good
ideas for school projects, for what type of career to pursue, and for how to spend
their free time. Even when we know what we want to do, sometimes we need a good
idea for how to do it.
When you need an idea, where do your ideas come from? Do they just come to you,
or do you think hard about it first? The survey below is about these kinds of
questions.
Over the past month, when I came up with ideas for what to do or how to do
it...
1. Ideas came from deep within me, or beyond me.
2. Ideas came to me spontaneously.
3. My ideas seemed to take shape on their own.
4. I generated ideas in a controlled and deliberate fashion.
5. I had complete control over my thought processes as I developed my ideas.
6. I was in control of my thought processes as I came up with ideas.
7. I could see my ideas vividly in my “mind’s eye.”
8. My ideas formed clear pictures in my mind.
9. I was able to “see” my ideas clearly as mental images.
10. My ideas took the form of language-based plans.
11. My ideas took the form of words or inner speech about how to proceed.
12. My ideas took the form of word-based thoughts or plans.
13. New or better possibilities became clear during a moment of insight.
14. I caught a glimpse of new or better possibilities.
15. My eyes were opened to new or better possibilities.
16. I generated logical and well-reasoned ideas.
17. My ideas were completely logical and rational.
18. I concluded that my ideas were logical and rational.
19. My ideas were inspired by something I encountered or recalled.
20. My ideas were stimulated by someone or something that inspired me.
21. My ideas were impacted by the inspiring ideas, actions, or creations of
others.
22. I put a great deal of effort into coming up with ideas.
23. I fully exerted myself while generating ideas.
24. I worked hard while generating ideas and plans.
25. I felt inspired to do something.
26. I felt inspired to act on my ideas right away, while they were still fresh in my
mind.
27. I felt inspired to express or give life to my ideas.
28. I worked hard to achieve my plans and ideas.
29. I put a great deal of effort into achieving my plans and ideas.
30. I fully exerted myself to achieve my plans and ideas.
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Appendix D
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a 5-point numbered scale from 1
(Very slightly or not at all) to 5 (Extremely).
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and
emotions. For each word, indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the
past month.
During the past month, I have felt...
1. Interested
2. Distressed
3. Excited
4. Upset
5. Strong
6. Guilty
7. Scared
8. Hostile
9. Enthusiastic
10. Proud
11. Irritable
12. Alert
13. Ashamed
14. Inspired
15. Nervous
16. Determined
17. Attentive
18. Jittery
19. Active
20. Afraid
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Appendix E
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a 7-point numbered scale from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).
Below are three statements regarding how satisfied you have been with your life
during the past month. Please be open and honest when answering.
During the past month...

1. In most ways my life has been close to my ideal.
2. The conditions of my life have been excellent.
3. I have been satisfied with my life.
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Appendix F
Meaning in Life Questionnaire
(MLQ; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a 7-point numbered scale from 1
(Absolutely untrue) to 7 (Absolutely true).
Please take a moment to think about what makes your life feel important to you.
Please respond to the following statements as truthfully and accurately as you can,
and also please remember that these are very subjective questions and that there
are no right or wrong answers.
During the past month, I have felt that...
1. I understand my life’s meaning.
2. I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful.
3. I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.
4. My life has a clear sense of purpose.
5. I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful.
6. I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.
7. I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant.
8. I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.
9. My life has no clear purpose.
10. I am searching for meaning in my life.
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Appendix G
Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (Pekala, 1991)
Note: Options below each item were presented on a 7-point numbered scale from 1
(Rarely or never) to 7 (Very often).
Please indicate how often you have had the following experiences during the past
month.
During the past month...
1. I had an experience that I would label as religious, spiritual, or
transcendental.
2. I had an experience of awe and reverence toward the world.
3. Existence became deeply sacred or meaningful.
4. I experienced profound and enlightening insights.

